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Private Property and Environmental
Regulatory Takings: A Forward Look
into Rights and Remedies, as
Illustrated by an Excursion into
the Wild Rivers Act of Kentucky*
INTRODUCTION
In November 1984, the Natural Resources and Environmen-
tal Protection Cabinet, Division of Water, of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, presented the Kentucky Water Management Plan'
to Gov. Martha Layne Collins. This Plan, developed in response
to Governor Collins' concern about water quality, provides the
framework for a statewide effort to prevent irreparable harm to
Kentucky's waters.
2
The Plan concentrates on several aspects of water control,'
one of which is the monitoring of surface waters. Specifically,
the Plan calls for "more aggressive management" of the state's
wild rivers .4 Although these streams are protected by the Ken-
tucky Wild Rivers Act, 5 enforcement of this legislation was
* This writer gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Don Challman, Natural
.Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, Division of Water; Thomas J.
FitzGerald, Attorney; and Arthur Lee Williams, Attorney, Natural Resources and En-
vironmental Protection Cabinet, in the collection of the wild rivers data.
I NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVTL. PROTECTION CABINET, DEP'T. FOR ENVTL.
PROTECTION, Div. OF WATER, KENTUCKY WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN, PROPOSAL TO
GOVERNOR MARTHA LAYNE COLLINS (Nov. 1984).
Id. at 1, 7-10.
These aspects include the protection of water-drinking, surface and ground-
water-floodplains and dams, by means of planning, financing, controlling water pol-
lution, educating the public and encouraging participation. See id. at 2-5.
See id. at 76.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 146.200-.360 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as KRS]. For an early history of the Kentucky Wild Rivers Act, see
Comment, Commonwealth v. Stephens: The Taking Doctrine At Work in Environmental
Law Use Planning, 65 Ky. L.J. 729, 737-40 (1976-77).
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hindered for nearly nine years by legal confrontations between
the state and private landowners. 6 The Kentucky Supreme Court's
November 1984 ruling in Commonwealth v. Stearns Coal &
Lumber Co., 7 however, ends the battle. This decision, favorable
to the Commonwealth, answers a number of questions concern-
ing the future of the Act." In addition, the decision was rendered
at a time of great congressional activity in the area of wilderness
conservation. 9 These events offer a timely opportunity both to
reassess the virtues of environmental land use legislation in Ken-
tucky and nationwide, 0 and to examine how these laws have
affected, and will affect, private property rights.
See text accompanying notes 117-28 infra.
678 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1984). Stearns Coal & Lumber filed an appeal with the
U.S. Supreme Court on February 12, 1985 (docket # 84-1292); the Court denied appeal
on July 2, 1985 for lack of a substantial federal question.
See text accompanying notes 156-60 infra.
The year 1984 marks the twentieth anniversary of the federal Wilderness Act
which established the National Wilderness Preservation System. See 16 U.S.C. § 1131
(1982). During the year, Congress passed substantial environmental legislation. Nineteen
wilderness bills became law between May and December. See Arizona Wilderness Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-406, 98 Stat. 1485; Arkansas Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-508, 98 Stat. 2349; California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98
Stat. 1619; Florida Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-430, 98 Stat. 1665; Georgia
Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-514, 98 Stat. 2416; Mississippi Wilderness Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 515, 98 Stat. 2420; Missouri Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-289, 98 Stat. 199; New Hampshire Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-323, 98
Stat. 259; North Carolina Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-324, 98 Stat. 263;
Oregon Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-328, 98 Stat. 272; Pennsylvania
Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-585, 98 Stat. 3100; Tennessee Wilderness Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-578, 98 Stat. 3088; Texas Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-574, 98 Stat. 3051; Utah Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-428, 98 Stat. 1657;
Vermont Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-322, 98 Stat. 253; Virginia Wilderness
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-586, 98 Stat. 3105; Washington Wilderness Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-339, 98 Stat. 299; Wisconsin Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
321, 98 Stat. 250; Wyoming Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-514, 98 Stat. 2807.
Four of the bills were accompanied by provisions for the expansion of the Wild
and Scenic Rivers System created in 1968. See 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1982). The California
Wilderness Act of 1984 includes 83 miles of the Tuolumne River in the System; the
Arizona Wilderness Act of 1984 adds 39.5 miles of the Verde River to same; the Oregon
Wilderness Act of 1984 was passed with a separate package, Pub. L. No. 98-494, 98
Stat. 2275, adding the Owybee and Illinois Rivers to the System; the New Hampshire
Wilderness Act contains a Wild and Scenic River Study for Wildcat Brook.
,0 For previous writings on the subject see, e.g., D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT
AND EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE (1981); E. MURPHY, NATURE, BUREAUCRACY
AND THE RULES OF PROPERTY (1977); Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power,
107 U. PA. L. REv. 1098 (1958-59); Kulser, Open Space Zoning: Valid Regulation or
Invalid Taking, 57 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1972-73); Metzger, Private Property and Environ-
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Private property has been regulated for decades, but land
use legislation has recently become more complex and more
intrusive on the freedom to use one's land." Historically, gov-
ernment action affecting private property was well-defined and
circumscribed. It included two major independent concepts, each
covered by a separate constitutional provision:' 2 eminent
domain' 3-with its "flip side" of inverse condemnation 4-and
mental Sanity, 5 Eco. L.Q. 793 (1975-76); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public
Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971-72); Comment, The Freshwater Wetlands Act: Permissive
Regulation v. Constructive Taking, 43 ALBANY L. REV. 295 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Freshwater Wetlands]; Comment, supra note 5, at 729.
See notes 31-33 infra and accompanying text.
2 Eminent domain is controlled by the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment: ". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The fifth amendment is made applicable to the
states by the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago, B.& Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 239 (1897).
Nearly half the states have a just compensation clause in their constitution. See
2A J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.26 (rev. 3d eds. 1980 &
1983). For a list of those states, see id. See also Comment, Inverse Condemnation and
the Alchemist's Lesson: You Can't Turn Regulations Into Gold, 21 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 171 n.l (1981) (for corresponding constitutional cites).
For example, the Kentucky Constitution Bill of Rights states in relevant part:
"[N]or shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use without the consent
of his representatives, and without just compensation being previously made to him."
KY. CONST. § 13. Also, § 242 provides: "Municipal and other corporations . . . taking
private property for public use shall make just compensation for property taken, injured
or destroyed by them." Ky. CONST. § 242.
It should be noted that the just compensation clause historically applies solely to
physical encroachments over property. The fifth amendment has its source in the Magna
Carta, where only a physical appropriation of land by government was considered a
taking. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE TAKING IssuE 319-20 (1973).
The constitutional limitation on the police power of the state is the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment which states in pertinent part: ". . . nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
" when a government physically takes private land for public use, it exercises its
power of eminent domain by instituting condemnation proceedings and compensating
the owner. The purchase of land by government for highway purposes is a common
instance of condemnation. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bradley, 483 S.W.2d 150 (Ky.
1972); Commonwealth v. Gisborne, 391 S.W.2d 714 (Ky. 1965).
"4 "Inverse condemnation is a monetary remedy sought by landowners alleging a
deprivation of property by a public agency without just compensation. It is a private
cause of action invoking the eminent domain clause of the federal or state constitutions."
Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491,
492 n.4 (1980-81).
An injured landowner has this remedy even in the absence of a statute since the
constitutional provision is self-executing. See notes 38-49 infra. See also Haigher, Mc-
Inerny & Rhodes, The Legislature's Role in the Taking Issue, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1,
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police power. 5 The viability of this dichotomy was gradually
tested in the early part of the twentieth century, both by the
demands of a changing economy' 6 and by the landmark decision
8 (1976); McNamara, Inverse Condemnation: A "Sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog",
31 BAYLOR L. REV. 443 (1979).
For a description of the difference between condemnation and inverse condemna-
tion, see United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255-59 (1980). For a general discussion
of eminent domain and inverse condemnation see J. SACKMAN, NIcHOLS' THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 12, at §§ 1.11, 6.21; Manley, Inverse Condemnation Under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 12 URB. LAW. 276 (1980); Note, De Facto Takings and the
Pursuit of Just Compensation, 48 FORD*Am L. REV. 334 (1979-80).
Inverse condemnation can be used when the taking is in the form of direct
occupation of the land. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979)
("[E]ven if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must
nonetheless pay just compensation."); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
(frequent plane flights over plaintiff's land is a taking); Portsmouth Harbor Land &
Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (military firing over plaintiff's property
is a taking).
Inverse condemnation also applies when the taking is the result of actions which
indirectly affect a piece of land. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
166, 174 (1871) (construction of a dam "by the State itself or by its express authority"
permanently flooding plaintiff's property); Keck v. Hafley, 237 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1951)
(diversion of a creek for highway construction purposes flooding private land); Com-
monwealth v. Kelley, 236 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1951) (improper management of highway
culverts caused flooding of adjoining land); Lincoln Loan Co. v. State, 545 P.2d 105
(Or. 1976) (creation of an atmosphere of condemnation near plaintiff's property is a
taking).
,1 The police power is not a physical appropriation of land for a public use, but
a regulatory tool used by governments to prevent or curb abusive private land uses. It
is "that power [of the state] required to be exercised in order to effectively discharge,
within the scope of constitutional limitations, its paramount obligation to promote and
protect the health, safety, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people." La Salle
Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 125 N.E.2d 609, 612 (Il1. 1955). The exercise
of police power can never be a taking since no land is physically taken, and relief for
abuses is invalidation, not monetary compensation. See generally id. (specifying when
zoning ordinances would be invalid).
There is an abundance of case law concerning exercise of the police power. See,
e.g., Blancett v. Montgomery, 398 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1966) (ordinance prohibiting ex-
ploitation of oil and gas within city limits); Township of Grosse Ile v. Dunbar & Sullivan
Dredging Co., 167 N.W.2d 311 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (injunction of a dike and fill
operation); Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255 (Or. 1965) (en banc) (prohibition of
automobile wrecking yards in certain areas); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761
(Wis. 1972) (shoreland zoning ordinance). See also Note, Protection of Environmental
Quality in Nonmetropolitan Regions by Limiting Development, 57 IowA L. REV. 126,
131-32 (1971-72) (discussing the contitutionality of zoning).
The historical contrast between eminent domain and the police power is described
in a number of cases. See, e.g., Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n, 153 A.2d 822,
824 (Conn. 1959) (a line established by the commission beyond which no structure is
allowed, and which encroaches on private land, is an exercise of the police power).
,1 The police power underwent the greatest upheaval, and its scope continues to
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of the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon.'7
Mahon introduced the doctrine of regulatory taking: a law
or zoning regulation can be so excessive that it amounts to a
taking of property. 8 As a result, the difference between police
power and eminent domain became not one of kind, but one of
degree. 9 While this concept appears simple enough, its an-
nouncement created chaos because in Mahon the Supreme Court
neither overruled its past decisions20 nor clarified what it meant
by an "excessive" exercise of the police power 2' or what remedy
would be available to an injured property owner. 22 These ques-
broaden. The Supreme Court has held: "[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guaranties
never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new
and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation.
In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise." Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). See Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto:
Aberration or New Direction in Land Use Law, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1570-71 (1976-
77) [hereinafter cited as Note, Eldridge v. City]; Note, supra note 15, at 132.
" 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
" In Mahon, a homeowner used a state law, prohibiting mining where it endangers
the surface support of dwellings, to have the coal company enjoined from mining under
his property. Id. at 412.
For regulatory deprivation of property value in general, see Manley, supra note
14, at 278-85; Comment, "Fair" is Fair: Valuing the Regulatory Taking, 15 U.C.D.L.
REv. 741, 745 (1981-82).
11 See Gordon, Compensable Regulatory Taking: A Tollbooth Rises on Regulation
Road, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 211, 214 (1983-84); Comment, supra note 12, at 173.
2,1 Before Mahon, a due process challenge only could be raised for excessive police
power. Cases such as Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (challenge to a state's
fishing regulations), and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (challenge to a state's
regulations of liquor manufacture), are still good law.
1' In Mahon, Justice Holmes stated: "[W]hile property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 260 U.S. at
415.
Subsequently, a "diminution of value test" to measure excessive police power was
developed and used by many state courts. See, e.g., Dooley v. Town Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 197 A.2d 770 (Conn. 1964); State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970);
Comm'r of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. 1965).
2 Justice Holmes did not say that any regulatory taking could bring monetary
compensation, as is the rule in an eminent domain situation. Indeed, the Court only
invalidated the law. See 260 U.S. at 416. Some commentators explain that Justice Holmes
may not have used "taking" in its constitutional sense. Commentators also point out
that Justice Brennan, in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 650-51 n.17 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting), indicated that no compensation was
granted in Mahon because the plaintiff did not ask for it. See Note, Eldridge v. City,
supra note 16, at 1574-76; Note, Takings Laws: Is Inverse Condemnation an Appropriate
Remedy for Due Process Violations? San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1980), 57 WASH. L. REv. 551, 556 (1981-82) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Takings Laws].
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tions remain unanswered. 23 In addition, while federal and state
courts have decided a number of land use cases, few have devised
creative solutions, particularly in the area of relief.24 Many courts
appear to be waiting for their legislatures to provide a remedy, 2
or for the Supreme Court to finally come forward. 26 Since the
latter has not occurred, 27 ad hoc determination is the rule to this
point. 2
Some general principles, however, can be abstracted from
Supreme Court decisions .29 This Note will analyze these princi-
ples in general and as they are applied to the area of environ-
mental controls, and will discuss the significant problems these
principles have engendered. The Note will then illustrate these
issues by focusing upon Kentucky and the impact of the Wild
Rivers Act upon its citizens and its courts. Finally, the Note will
attempt to anticipate the continuing impact of the Act as well
as the trend of remedies to excessive land use regulation in
general.
I. THE TAKING QUESTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS
Penalizing a private landowner for damaging his neighbor's
property is not a new idea. 0 What is new is the concept that
" The Supreme Court has upheld all land use regulations since Mahon. See San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1980) (open space regulation);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (regulation imposing larger residential
lots); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(protection of historic buildings); Golblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)
(prohibition of excavations below water table).
14 See notes 186-88 infra and accompanying text.
I5 E.g., Florida has a statutory remedy. After exhausting administrative remedies,
an injured landowner may ask for judicial review of environmental permit decisions.
Relief may be: 1) issuance of the permit; 2) award of monetary damages; or, 3)
modification of the decision. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.617 (West Supp. 1984).
21 See notes 180-99 infra and accompanying text.
-" The Court admits candidly that it "has been unable to develop any 'set formula'
for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government .... Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. at 124. This sentence is repeated almost word for word in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2874 (1984).
2- A history of the Supreme Court's handling of the issue is found in Annot., 57
L. ED. 2d 1254 (1979). See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964-
65); Note, Reexamining the Supreme Court's View of the Taking Clause, 58 Tax. L.
REv. 1447 (1979-80).
- See note 23 supra.
,0 See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (government-ordered destruction of
ornamental trees noxious to neighboring commercial orchard); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915) (operation of a brickyard enjoined as harmful to residences in
vicinity); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. at 623.
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ownership spawns not only rights but also responsibilities to the
public as a whole.3' Society's values encourage economically
successful enterprises, but the average citizen does not want them
to be noxious to the general welfare. 32 As a result, most people
now accept a measure of public control over private land through
the exercise of police power.33 This is especially true in the area
of conservation: the public desires a clean and healthful envi-
ronment and is aware that this cannot be attained without legal
interference. 34
A. The Right to a Healthful Environment: Constitutional and
Statutory Sources and Applications
As described earlier, property enjoyment is protected by
constitutional rights, and remedies exist against violations of
these rights. 35 Constitutional dignity was recently bestowed upon
ecological general welfare in some states,36 with eleven states
adding an environmental "Bill of Rights" to their constitutions
between 1969 and 1973.1 7 The greatest protection is offered by
a self-executing clause, such as that found in the Constitution
of Pennsylvania.3t Less protection is found where the state con-
" The growing awareness that land is not solely a tool for making money is well
expressed by this statement: "We are continually being made aware that our vital natural
resources, our whole ecology, and the quality of human life, may no longer be considered
limitless or indestructible .... [T]he right to use land should be carefully measured
against the environment's capacity to tolerate such a use." Usdin v. State, 414 A.2d
280, 289 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1980), aff'd, 430 A.2d 949 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1981).
" See generally Note, supra note 15, at 132-134. This suggests that property rules
can no longer remain static. See E. MURPHY, supra note 10, at 168-206.
11 For an overview of the evolution of the concept of private property in the
western world, see Metzger, supra note 10, at 802-0 .
See E. MURPHY, supra note 10, at 236-40.
See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
See D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L. MCBENNETT & B. VESTAL, CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGIMENT 105 (1977); Tobin, Some Observations on the Use of
State Constitutions to Protect the Environment, 3 ENvmL. AxF. 473 (1974).
" See, FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7; ILL. CONsT. art. XI, § 1; MASs. CONST. amend.
art. 49, § 179; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52; MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 1; N.M. CONST.
art. XX, § 21; N.Y. CoNsT. art. XIV; N.C. CoNsr. art. XIV, § 5; PA. CONST. art. I, §
27; R.I. CONST. amend. Art. 37; VA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2.
" The state constitution holds:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation
of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all
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stitution merely sets forth public policy and delegates implemen-
tation df the mandate to the legislative body.39
The U.S. Constitution does not offer explicit protection of
the environment, and those who have found it in the ninth
amendment 4 remain a minority.4' Statutes, therefore, are the
cornerstones of conservation at the federal level. 42 States have
been equally active in environmental legislation, passing laws
and zoning regulations covering a wide range of public concerns,
including the preservation of historical landmarks,43 open spaces, *
sensitive lands (especially floodplains and wetlands),45 wild
the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources,
the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of
all the people.
PA. CoNsr. art. I, § 27. The clause was construed in Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg
Battlefield Tower Inc., 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973) and Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 323 A.2d 407 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 361 A.2d 263
(1976).
19 For example, the New Mexico Constitution declares:
The protection of the state's beautiful and healthful environment is hereby
declared to be of fundamental importance to the public interest, health,
safety and the general welfare. The legislature shall provide for control of
pollution and control of despoilment of the air, water and other natural
resources of this state, consistent with the use and development of these
resources for the maximum benefit of the people.
N.M. CoNsT. art. XX, § 21.
A clause such as this one is called "implementing," whereas the one found in the
Pennsylvania Constitution is called "self-executing" because it needs no statute to be
passed in order to be enforced. See text accompanying notes 125-26 infra for an example
from Kentucky.
10 "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
11 Environmentalists had entertained great hopes after the holding in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which confirmed the ninth amendment "as a source
of previously unenumerated rights." Tobin, supra note 36, at 474.
.Z See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1982); Soil
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 16 U.S.C. § 590 (1982); Wilderness Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1131 (1982); Wild & Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1982); National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982); The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7401 (1982).
11 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107 n.1 (1978).
See generally 438 U.S. 104 (Landmarks Preservation Law); Maher v. City of New
Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976) (preservation
of French Quarter); Bohannan v. City of San Diego, 106 Cal. Rptr. 333 (Cal. Ct. App.
1973) (Old San Diego Planning District ordinance).
- See generally San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981) (concerning California's open space law).
11 See generally Candlestick Properties Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (protection of shoreline); Brec-
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rivers, 46 forests47 and wildlife.4 8
The constitutional and statutory protection of both private
property rights and the general welfare makes conflict inevitable.
In addition, the emergence of ecological concerns has stretched
the boundaries of the legitimate exercise of police power even
further.49 Police power gives states the authority to enact laws
to promote "health, safety, convenience, morals or welfare." 50
These laws are implemented through zoning ordinances or reg-
ulations by municipalities and, more recently, by administrative
agencies .5
The goal of preventing harm to the public is easier for
regulated landowners to accept than that of the pursuit of a
public benefit, since environmental legislation forces the land-
owners to bear the physical burden of the control while the
advantage goes to the public. 2 It is precisely this harm/benefit
distinction which pervaded early conservation efforts.53 Laws
ciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Envtl. Protection, 362 A.2d 948 (Conn. 1975) (tidal
wetland); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973) (floodplain); S. Kemble Fischer Realty Trust v. Board of
Appeals of Concord, 402 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011
(1980) (floodplain); Spears v. Berle, 397 N.E.2d 1304 (N.Y. 1979) (wetlands); Gaebel v.
Thornbury Township, 303 A.2d 57 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (floodplain); Just v. Mari-
nette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (shoreland zoning).
"' See notes 98-99 infra.
" See generally Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d
956 (1st Cir. 1972) (ordinance reducing lot sizes in forest conservation zone); West
Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971)
(prohibition of mining and logging in wilderness area); McMichael v. United States, 355
F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1965) (prohibition of motor vehicles in primitive area of national
forest).
41 See generally Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1981) (prohi-
bition of goose hunting near a lake); State v. Lake Lawrence Public Lands Protection
Ass'n, 601 P.2d 494 (Wash. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980) (rural
zoning for protection of endangered birds).
11 The focus of this Note is on state govermnent resolution of these conflicts. Of
course, the federal government has also played a major role, as demonstrated by the
legislative citations in note 42 supra.
'0 Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d at 896.
" An example of such procedure is the Wild Rivers Act of Kentucky. See notes
113-16 infra and accompanying text.
" See Mandelker, supra note 14, at 499-500.
"See I RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, §§ 7.01-.03 (4th ed.
1984).
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explicitly benefitting the public were regularly struck,5 4 while
laws expressly aimed at protecting the public from potential
physical harm were usually upheld.5 5 However, a change in
attitude gradually developed during the 1970s . 6 Courts, in par-
ticular, realized that when one talks of either harm or benefit,
one is presenting two sides of the same coin.5 7 One commentator
eloquently describes this interdependency:
[W]hen estuaries are polluted, the polluter profits, but the
shellfish industry suffers. When acid rain falls upon the forest,
the emitter profits but the forest industry suffers. When bio-
cides are massively sprayed, the agrochemical industry profits
but the honey-gatherer suffers. The common profit is as non-
existent as the common cost.5 s
Along with this recognition grew an awareness that the burdened
landowners themselves are members of the public and, therefore,
also benefit from the regulations.5 9
See, e.g., Dooley v. Town Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 197 A.2d 770 (Conn.
1964) (zoning change for public benefit invalid); State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me.
1970) (protection of coastal wetland for public benefit invalid); MacGibbon v. Board of
Appeals, 255 N.E.2d 347 (Mass. 1970) (preservation of private land for public benefit
is invalid exercise of police power); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township
of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963) (ordinance restricting use of swamp-
land for public benefit is invalid).
,1 See Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 897 (permit required before filling San Francisco Bay);
Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Gov'r of Maryland, 293 A.2d 241 (Md.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1040 (1972) (sand and gravel company prohibited from dredging and taking
away sand and gravel, in order to protect marshland); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of
Dedham, 284 N.E.2d at 891 (zoning to prohibit residence in areas subject to flooding).
16 For a history of this change of attitude, see Usdin v. State, 414 A.2d at 284-90.
17 The Supreme Court of New Jersey realized this as early as 1974: "[V]ital
ecological and environmental considerations of recent cognizance have brought about
rather drastic land use restrictions in furtherance of a policy designed to protect impor-
tant public interests wide in scope and territory .... Cases arising in such a context
may properly call for a reexamination of some [earlier] statements. . . ." AMG Assocs.
v. Township of Springfield, 319 A.2d 705, 711 n.4 (N.J. 1974). See also Rose, When
are Environmental Restrictions on Land Use Compensable?, 9 REAL EsT. L.J. 233, 237-
38 (1980-81).
" E. MURPHY, supra note 10, at 177.
19 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 134-35 (plaintiff
citizen benefits from historical landmarks); Krahl v. Nine Mile Creek Watershed Dist.,
283 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 1979) (riparian feeholder gains from flood control); Usdin
v. State, 414 A.2d at 290 (plaintiff's employees will be protected through floodplain
regulation).
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This philosophical shift, resulting in greater acceptance of
land use control legislation, has expressed itself in different ways.
Some jurisdictions continue to pay lip-service to the harm/ben-
efit dichotomy, but they manipulate the labels carefully to char-
acterize the intent of all environmental legislation under review
as harm avoidance. 60 Others have abandoned the traditional
distinction and have focused their attention on the legitimacy of
the governmental scheme. 61 Despite these ideological approaches
to the problem, there is mainstream acceptance of a two-prong
test to assess whether or not a particular land use control is
within the constitutional requisites for exercising police power.
The first prong analyzes the kind of interference wrought by the
legislation, while the second prong analyzes the degree of inter-
ference with specific land.62
Environmental land use control is regularly found to meet
the first prong because there is a presumption of its rational
relationship to a legitimate objective of police power. 63 Because
police power is an elastic concept,6 because general welfare
authorizing its use is a label that can be affixed to a wide range
of concerns, 65 and because the rational basis test provides only
10 See Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1083 (1981) (denial of development of wetland area to prevent adverse ecological
impact is permissible); Usdin v. State, 414 A.2d at 280 (designation of plaintiff's property
as flood land valid because protection of public against harm); Just v. Marinette County,
201 N.W.2d at 761 (good discussion of the dichotomy).
" See Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Envtl. Protection, 362 A.2d 948
(public welfare paramount to private gain); Moskow v. Comm'r of Dept. of Envtl.
Mgt., 427 N.E.2d 750 (Mass. 1981) (plaintiff did not lose all uses of his property because
of government scheme); Spears v. Berle, 397 N.E.2d 1304 (N.Y. 1979) (for regulation
to be invalid, it must destroy all uses of the land).
62 See generally Shedd, Inverse Condemnation: Will the Supreme Court Allow it?,
9 REAL EST. L.J. 336, 340-43 (1980-81) (examining Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York); Note, supra note 15, at 132-38 (examining different tests for zoning ordi-
nances).
- The rational basis test for economic due process challenges was spelled out in
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), and has often been repeated. See, e.g.,
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84-85 (1980); Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1974).
" See Note, supra note 15, at 132.
61 See Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation under the Police Power: The New General
Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 V.ND. L. REv. 603, 604 (1981).
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minimal scrutiny, 66 the general rule is that environmental land
use laws will be presumed constitutional. 67
However, the second prong of the test offers the injured
landowner an opportunity to rebut this presumption. A plaintiff
might demonstrate that a regulation, even though legitimate and
constitutional on its face, works an unfair degree of interference
with his or her property.6 In the area of environmental control,
the exercise of police power is considered excessive when its
impact is confiscatory, discriminatory, or arbitrary. 69 Land use
control is confiscatory when it totally and permanently destroys
all economic uses of the land7 -it is not enough that the land
was devalued,7' that owners have lost the right to choose how
to use their property72 or are deprived of an existing use, 73 or
I The Supreme Court has said:
We refuse to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation,"
. . .and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used
the Due Process Clause "to strike down state laws, regulatory of business
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or
out of harmony with a particular school of thought."
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
67 Should the law be found unconstitutional, invalidation is the traditional remedy.
See note 15 supra.
' Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court has not looked at an "as applied" case since
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (involving the inclusion of a piece
of private business property into a residential district by municipal ordinance), state
courts for the most part handle "as applied" cases. See D. MANDELKER, LAND USE
LAW 23, 30 (1982).
69 See Randle, The National Reserve System and Transferable Development Rights:
Is the New Jersey Pinelands Plan an Unconstitutional "Taking"?, 10 B.C. ENVra. A'.
L. REv. 183, 208-24 (1982-83).
70 Regulation and prohibition are two completely different things. See Benenson
v. United States, 548 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (all alternative uses taken away from
plaintiff in order to preserve historic building); Burrows v. City of Keene, 432 A.2d 15
(N.H. 1981) (amending zoning deprived plaintiff of all profitable uses of his property);
Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 275 N.E.2d 585 (N.Y. 1971) (regulation is confiscatory
when it takes away all reasonable uses for which land is adapted).
" The Supreme Court has indicated that, when alternate uses are left to the
landowner, great losses of property value will be tolerated. For example, in Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915), the loss was approximately 92%, and in Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926), the loss was 75%.
72 In particular, a landowner does not have a vested right to change the "essential
natural character" of his land. See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
Neither does he have a vested right in a prior zoning classification. See HFH, Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 542 P.2d 237, 240 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
" The Supreme Court has held that "the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle
is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." Andrus v. Allard,
1984-1985] WILD RIvERs ACT
even that owners are denied the best and most profitable use. 74
Discriminatory land use regulation is found in the absence of a
comprehensive plan equally affecting all similarly situated realty.75
Land use control is arbitrary when it is an abuse of police
power-that is, when its purpose and manner of implementation
indicate that the regulator is acting in bad faith and is solely
interested in facilitating a uniquely public function at the expense
of private constituents.76
The injured landowner may have a cause of action if he can
prove one of these excesses. Proof, however, is a difficult task
444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (Eagle Protection Act upheld).
See Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Envtl. Protection, 362 A.2d at 948
(prevention of land fill in wetlands is permitted because other uses are still possible);
Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n, 153 A.2d 822 (Conn. 1959) (plaintiff deprived of
only one activity on his land along river bank); State v. Lake Lawrence Public Lands
Protection Ass'n, 601 P.2d at 494 (protection of eagle habitat; only one use taken away
from landowner).
7, See Manor Dev. Corp. v. Conservation Comm'n, 433 A.2d 999 (Conn. 1980)
(economically optimum use of land taken away by wetlands regulation); S.A. Healy Co.
v. Town of Highland Beach, 355 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (downzoning
to slow down ''headlong plunge toward wall-to-wall concrete" permissible even though
it precludes the most economically advantageous use of the land); Turner v. Town of
Walpole, 409 N.E.2d 807 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (floodplain zoning is not confiscatory
if private property cannot be shown to be free from flooding hazard).
11 See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Village of Winfield, 274
N.E.2d 144 (I1. App. Ct. 1971) (floodplain regulation discriminatory toward plaintiff's
land); Burrows v. City of Keene, 432 A.2d 15 (N.H. 1981) (plaintiff's land singled out
for open space zoning). That an ordinance affects different people in different degrees
does not invalidate the provision when it has a rational relation to a legitimate objective
of the police power. See City of Leadville v. Rood, 600 P.2d 62, 64 (Colo. 1979).
16 Many examples of abuse of police power could be cited. See, e.g., Urbanizadora
Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1983) (local government "froze"
use of private.land for fourteen years in anticipation of public use without condemna-
tion); Hager v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d
619 (Ky. 1953) (city had no statutory authority to incorporate plaintiff's property into
its flood protection plan); Schwing v. City of Baton Rouge, 249 So. 2d 304 (La. Ct.
App. 1971) (city allowed no building in an area where it had no present plans of public
use); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Chadwick, 405 A.2d 241
(Md. 1979) (land frozen for three years in anticipation of use as a public park was a
taking); Gordon v. City of Warren Planning & Urban Renewal Comm'n, 199 N.W.2d
465 (Mich. 1972) (city passed a no-building ordinance in anticipation of street building,
and then did nothing); Jensen v. City of New York, 369 N.E.2d 1179 (N.Y. 1977)
(official street map made it impossible for plaintiff to obtain financing, or sell property,
for indefinite period); San Antonio River Authority v. Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (utility permit refused in order to keep land value down for future
purchase by agency); Howell Plaza Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 226 N.W.2d 185
(Wis. 1975) (landowner may have been deprived of beneficial use of his property in
anticipation of highway building).
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because the landowner's idea of excess is likely to be broader
than that of those whose property is not directly affected by the
regulation. An illustration of this problem is offered by the
concept of aesthetic controls.
B. The Special Place of Aesthetics;7
The public has become aware that the preservation of some
virgin lands and streams plays a major role in maintaining
general health and comfort. However, the private landowner,
who is determined to challenge the environmental regulation of
his property, might attempt to downplay this important function.
He or she could instead focus on and attack another facet of
ecological controls-the protection of natural beauty. This pros-
pect needs to be addressed initially, therefore, so that the legit-
imacy of ranking beauty among the rationales for conservation
may be assessed.
In order to ascertain whether aesthetic controls are a valid
exercise of the police power, one must first determine the kind
of interference they create. In Berman v. Parker,78 the U.S.
Supreme Court declared that "[t]he concept of public welfare is
broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well
as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary." 79 This statement,
however, did not reflect widespread belief at the time. Early
cases indicate that considering aesthetics as on a par with other
concerns, such as health and morals, was not palatable to many
landowners.8 0 Landowners argued that beauty is a subjective
concept escaping a universally agreed upon definition,"' and
objected to abridging their property rights for the mere sake of
" See RATHKOPF, supra note 53, at § 14.01; Rowlett, supra note 65, at 603;
Leighty, Aesthetics as a Legal Basis for Environmental Control, 17 WAYNE L. REv.
1347 (1971).
Is 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
71 Id. at 33 (citation omitted). The same principle is expressed in Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 129; Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 387-88.
" See Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 74 N.E. 601 (Mass. 1905); People
v. Green, 83 N.Y.S. 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1903); Bryan v. City of Chester, 61 A. 894
(Pa. 1905).
8 See Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of Aesthetic
Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1977-78); Rowlett, supra note 65, at 606.
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public enjoyment. In short, they relied on the traditional harm/
benefit dichotomy."
However, landowners did not challenge all land use legisla-
tion ostensibly based on aesthetics. For example, the public did
not object strongly when local governments started regulating
billboard advertising on highways. 83 This reaction can be par-
tially explained by the safety element of the legislative intent:
billboards are not only unsightly, they are also dangerous and
capable of distracting a driver's concentration.8 4 Nevertheless,
aesthetic controls were soon brought within the definition of
general welfare, thereby increasing the range of acceptable reg-
ulation. As a result, these controls became a legitimate exercise
of the police power85 and benefitted from the aforementioned
judicial presumption of constitutionality. 86 However, it is still
extremely rare for aesthetics alone to justify a restraint upon
private property, and only a few states accept such an argu-
ment.8 7 More typically, aesthetic concerns must be coupled with
economic and social considerations in order to be acceptable to
the public. Consequently, regulating authorities point out to
1Z See notes 50-58 supra and accompanying text.
83 See, e.g., Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); Opinion of the Justices,
169 A.2d 762 (N.H. 1961).
" See Central Advertising Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 201 N.W.2d 365, 370 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1972); State v. Smith, 618 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1981).
8'Tjhere is a growing judicial recognition of the power ... to impose...
restrictions which can be justified solely upon the ground that they will
tend to prevent or minimize discordant and unsightly surroundings ....
The change may be ascribed ... to the judicial expansion of the police
power to include within the concept of "general welfare" the enhancement
of the citizen's cultural life.
Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255, 261 (Or. 1965).
See City of Leadville v. Rood, 600 P.2d at 63; La Salle Nat'l Bank v. City of
Evanston, 312 N.E.2d 625, 632 (Ill. 1974); Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. of Minn.
v. Village of Minnetonka, 162 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Minn. 1968); Piper v. Meredith, 266
A.2d 103, 108 (N.H. 1970); People v. Berlin, 307 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (N.Y. D.C. 1970).
0 See, e.g., Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1960); State v.
Diamond Motors, Inc., 429 P.2d 825 (Hawaii 1967); People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272
(N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963); Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d at 261-
62.
It is noteworthy that much disagreement exists among commentators regarding the
number of states which have actually endorsed "aesthetics alone" as a legitimate exercise
of police power. The reason is that courts have not always expressed their position very
clearly. See Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority of Jurisdictions
Authorize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 UMKC L. REv. 125 (1979-80); Rowlett, supra note
65, at 605-06 n.16.
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landowners that the protection of beautiful surroundings helps
raise property values, makes people happier and more produc-
tive, and attracts tourism and business to their area."8
Although including aesthetics within the definition of the
general welfare makes it a proper subject for the exercise of
police power, the degree of interference which aesthetic controls
impose on a particular piece of property must also be legitimate.
A land use regulation will be invalid as applied if it permanently
confiscates all beneficial uses of the land, discriminates among
feeholders, or is an abuse of governmental authority for the
pursuit of self-serving goals.8 9
Kentucky is an appropriate focus for an analysis of the
legitimacy of aesthetic values as applied to land use because the
Commonwealth belongs to the small number of states supporting
regulations based upon aesthetics alone.90 In Jasper v. Common-
wealth,9' the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the "Junk Yard
Act,'' 92 stating:
The obvious purpose of this Act is to enhance the scenic beauty
of our roadways by prohibiting the maintenance of unsightly
vehicle graveyards within the view of travellers thereon. While
there may be a public safety interest promoted, the principal
objective is based upon aesthetic considerations. Though it has
been held that such considerations are not sufficient to warrant
the invocation of the police power, in our opinion the public
welfare is not so limited. 93
" See Rowlett, supra note 65, at 621-38; Williams, Planning Law in the 1980s:
What Do We Know About I?, 7 VT. L. REv. 205, 220-21 (1982); Leighty, supra note
77, at 1392-94.
See, e.g., Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7
(N.Y. 1974) (confiscatory landmark designation). But cf. City of Leadville v. Rood, 600
P.2d at 62 (an exception to setback requirements for certain buildings is not discrimi-
natory); Grobman v. City of Des Plaines, 322 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1975) (minimum lot area
limitations not unreasonable).
'o See note 87 supra and accompanying text. Note however that Kentucky is listed
as a state where aesthetic regulation is an open question. See Bufford, supra note 87,
at 151, 153-54.
91 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964).
2 KRS §§ 177.905-.990.
91 375 S.W.2d at 711.
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The court has affirmed this position many times, extending it,
for example, to billboard advertising and other commercial en-
terprises .94
II. THE KENTUCKY WILD RIVERS ACT
Kentucky's progressive stance towards aesthetics is truly re-
markable, and so it is not surprising that Kentucky is one of
twenty-five states which, between 1965 and 1975, adopted leg-
islation aimed at protecting the scenic and aesthetic values of
wild rivers.95
A. Federal and State Wild Rivers
In 1968, Congress responded to public concern over the
danger of extinction threatening the nation's nonnavigable fresh
waters96 by enacting the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. 97 Several
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stephens, 539 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1976) (preservation
of aesthetic values under Wild Rivers Act held constitutional); Moore v. Ward, 377
S.W.2d at 881 (billboard advertising). In Department for Natural Resources & Envtl.
Protection v. No. 8 Limited of Virginia, 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1975), the court said in
dicta "that the General Assembly ... might strike a balance between the 'energy crunch'
and the necessity to ... protect aesthetic beauty." Id. at 686.
91 See J. KUSLER, REGULATING SENSITIVE LANDS, 35-37 (1980); Comment, supra
note 5, at 730.
In addition to legislation, wild rivers have also received the support of the common
law public trust doctrine. This doctrine, which holds that certain natural resources are
kept in trust by the government for public benefit, formerly applied solely to commer-
cially-used navigable waters, their shores and resources. Recently, it has been extended
to include wild rivers and recreational, ecological, scientific and aesthetic uses. See W.
RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 170 (1977); Sax, The Public Trust Doc-
trine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 471
(1969-70). Additional information is also found in The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resources Law and Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 181 (1980-81).
See Goodell, Waterway Preservation: The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968,
7 B.C. ENVTL. AP:. L. REV. 43 (1978-79).
- This Congressional declaration of policy reads:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States that certain
selected rivers of the Nation which, with their immediate environments,
possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and
wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall be preserved in
free-flowing condition, and that they and their immediate environments
shall be protected for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future
generations.
16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1982).
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states followed suit,98 supporting the federal system with their
own network of protected rivers and streams. 99 Kentucky is one
of those states.I°° The General Assembly has recognized that it
has a "strong obligation to the people of Kentucky to preserve
these remnants of their proud heritage."'' In order to carry out
this obligation, the legislature sanctioned the protection of "cer-
tain streams of Kentucky possess[ing] outstanding and unique
scenic, recreational, geological, fish and wildlife, botanical, his-
torical, archeological and other scientific, aesthetic, and cultural
values." 10 2
Contrary to the federal wild rivers system which is based
upon governmental acquisition of fee title to,10 3 or scenic ease-
ments over,' °4 sensitive riverside lands, 05 the state wild rivers
statutes do not generally rely on eminent domain. Zoning is the
more commonly used tool, usually permitting existing uses to
continue and closely supervising future uses. 1°6 It has served
environmental concerns well in jurisdictions where the affected
land is being kept mostly in its natural state or being used for
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5093.50 (West 1984) (California Wild & Scenic
Rivers Act); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-350 (Michie 1982) (Georgia Scenic Rivers Act of
1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21, § 17B (Law. Co-op 1980) (Scenic and Recreational
Rivers and Streams); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 281.761 (West 1979) (Natural River
Act of 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 104.31 (West 1977) (Minnesota Wild & Scenic Rivers
Act); N.Y. ENVIRON. CONSERV. LAW § 15-2701 (West 1984) (Wild, Scenic and Recrea-
tional Rivers System); N.C. GEM. STAT. § 113A-30 (Michie 1983) (Natural & Scenic
Rivers Act of 1971); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1501-16 (Anderson 1978) (,Vild, Scenic
or Recreational River Areas); ORE. REv. STAT. § 390.805 (1981) (Scenic Waterways);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-13-101 (Michie 1980) (Tennessee Scenic Rivers Act of 1968). For
a complete list of those states, see J. KUSLER, supra note 95, at 35.
See Goodell, supra note 96, at 44.
See the Kentucky Wild Rivers Act, KRS §§ 146.200-.360. The language of KRS
§ 146.220 (1982) indicates that Kentucky subscribes to the public trust doctrine to further
protect the wild rivers. See note 95 supra for a discussion of the doctrine.
" KRS § 146.220.
1o1 Id. As indicated earlier, the wild rivers also play a key role in the preservation
of water quality statewide. See notes 1-4 supra.
303 By acquiring the land, the government seeks to form a protective "corridor,
approximately one-quarter mile in width, along either side of the designated river."
Goodell, supra note 96, at 50.
1' For cases discussing scenic easements see Kiernat v. County of Chisago, 564 F.
Supp. 1089 (D. Minn. 1983) and United States v. Hanten, 500 F. Supp. 188 (D. Or.
1980).
,01 See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. FEURER, T. RICHTER, FEDERAL LAND USE
REGULATION 294-297 (1977).
' See, e.g., KRS § 146.290 (1982) (land uses permitted in stream area).
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residential, agricultural or timber purposes only. 0 7 In Kentucky,
however, wild river regulation has two unique problems which
are potentially more harmful to fragile waters than a farm or a
small logging operation: (1) the presence of mineral resources'08
in the stream area and (2) private commercial facilities interested
in the most profitable use of the land. °9 The private residents
in the zones designated for protection by the General Assembly
objected strongly to new constraints on their activities." 0 Al-
though all interested parties agreed the Wild Rivers Act is con-
stitutional,"' the disputes raised the issue of whether the
implementation of the Act by the Natural Resources and Envi-
ronmental Protection Cabinet (the Cabinet) created an uncon-
stitutional regulatory taking." 2
B. The Kentucky Wild Rivers Act and the Taking Question
The Kentucky Wild Rivers Act was enacted in 1972."1 It
gives the Cabinet's Secretary the responsibility for administering
the system, and the Secretary is empowered to "adopt such rules
or regulations necessary for the preservation and enhancement
of the stream areas." " 4 While the Act was later modified con-
siderably by several amendments," 5 in particular as to the land
uses permitted in the protected zone," 6 the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, in both Commonwealth v. Stephens,"7 and Common-
,o' See, e.g., County of Pine v. State, 280 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1979) (constitution-
ality of Wild and Scenic Rivers Ordinance at issue); Spears v. Berle, 397 N.E.2d 1304
(N.Y. 1979) (denial of mining permit for wetlands area upheld); Scott v. State, 541 P.2d
516 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (Scenic Waterways Act is reasonable and not a taking).
- For a description of the mineral wealth of the area see note 154 infra.
- For example, an amusement town or a mining company. See notes 119, 121
infra and accompanying text.
"a See Commonwealth v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co., 678 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Stephens, 539 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1976). For the detailed background
of these cases see notes 120, 122-23 infra and accompanying text.
M See Brief on Behalf of Appellee and Cross-Akppellant at 43, Commonwealth v.
Stearns Coal & Lumber Co., 678 S.W.2d 378 [hereinafter cited as Appellee's Brief], 539
S.W.2d at 306.
See 678 S.W.2d at 380; 539 S.W.2d at 306.
"' 1972 Enact. Acts ch. 117 (codified as amended at KRS §§ 146.200-.360).
" KRS § 146.270 (1982).
"' 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 197 (amending KRS §§ 146.210-.290 (1972)).
1,6 See notes 155-60 infra and accompanying text.
11 539 S.W.2d 303.
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wealth v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co.,' 8 construed only the 1972
version of the Act.
Morris Stephens owned an amusement town bordering on
the Cumberland River, one of the waterways protected by the
Act." 9 When he attempted to clear land close to the river, the
Commonwealth sought an injunction in Franklin Circuit Court. 20
Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. is involved in mining, leasing and
selling coal and timber lands in southern Kentucky and northern
Tennessee. 121 Stearns challenged the Cabinet by indicating its
plans to engage in all the land uses then prohibited by the Act.'2
When the Cabinet attempted to stop the company, Stearns sued
the Commonwealth in McCreary Circuit Court and obtained a
ruling in its favor. 2 3
Stephens and Stearns Coal & Lumber both came to the
Supreme Court on appeal from circuit court holdings that the
Act had effectuated a compensable taking of property. 2 4 The
Supreme Court held that there was no taking as a matter of
law, because the Wild Rivers Act was enabling and not self-
executing legislation 2 and had yet to be implemented by the
Commonwealth. 2 6 Despite their general holding, these cases,
particularly Stearns Coal & Lumber, contain dictum which is of
great significance to this discussion. This dictum reveals the
Court's approach to future litigation regarding not only wild
rivers legislation, but also land use regulations in general. 7
I's 678 S.W.2d 378.
19 See KRS § 146.241.
2 539 S.W.2d at 304. See Comment, supra note 5, at 741-46 for a detailed analysis
of the case.
2 Appellee's Brief, supra note 111, at 1.
678 S.W.2d at 380.
12 Id.
124 See Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth, No. 2994 (McCreary Cir.
Ct., Jan. 30, 1981); Commonwealth v. Stephens, No. 85519 (Franklin Cir. Ct., June
23, 1975).
a2 678 S.W.2d at 381; 539 S.W.2d at 306-07.
26 Stearns Coal & Lumber argued that the Act had been implemented: they pointed
out that signs had been erected along the streams, some of them on their property,
indicating the protected status of the spot, that these activities had been broadcast, and
that maps and brochures of the area were circulating publicly. Appellee's Brief, supra
note 111, at 5-6. To this, the Court replied Stearns Coal & Lumber could have sued for
trespass and obtained an injunction, but these actions by the Commonwealth did not
amount to implementation of the Act. 678 S.W.2d at 381.
127 See 678 S.W.2d at 381-82.
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Indeed, the Court in Stearns Coal & Lumber stated that "[iln
Kentucky, the Wild Rivers Act, if it had been fully executed,
could have been a taking.'1 28 Thus, the question is clearly raised.
Before trying to ascertain what the Court meant and whether
the potential ills of the original Wild Rivers Act were cured by
the Amendments,' 29 it is necessary to review the Kentucky Su-
preme Court's definition of a regulatory taking. Although Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon"30 introduced the concept of
regulatory taking, the U.S. Supreme Court has not faithfully
followed its precedent and has avoided enunciating a general
rule in subsequent decisions.' Kentucky's highest court has
stated that Mahon is generally regarded as "an extreme case,"' 3 2
and has demonstrated a willingness to grant broad police power
to state and local governments.'33 Nonetheless, the Court also
stated that Mahon "vividly illustrates the superiority of consti-
tutional rights."'134 In Kentucky, as elsewhere, 3 5 a valid exercise
of police power does not violate these constitutional rights 3 6
because it is never a taking of property without due process or
without just compensation. 37 As described in Moore v. Ward,'38
, Id. at 381.
For a description of the main weaknesses of the 1972 Act see text accompanying
note 164 infra.
"4 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
" Bond Bros. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 211 S.W.2d
867, 873 (Ky. 1948) (imposition of sewer tax in violation of agreement not to tax is not
valid exercise of police power), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 943 (1950).
"' As early as 1938, the Court stated:
Increasing contacts, antagaonisms and conflict of human interests have
produced a growing general recognition of the desirability of the exercise
of, and the necessity for, mutually cooperative action and restraint by
fellowmen and neighbors for the common good and welfare of each other,
as well as the general public, which more and more impels the courts to
uphold police regulatory measures, the mere mention of which in the not
far distant past would have caused a genuine case of constitutional "jitters"
on the part of lawyers and courts.
Whitaker v. Green River Coal Co., 122 SW.2d 1012, 1016 (Ky. 1938)(state power to
regulate mining held not violative of miner's constitutional right to due process).
" 211 S.W.2d at 873.
"' See, e.g., DePaul v. Kauffman, 272 A.2d 500 (Pa. 1971) (legitimate exercise of
state's police power may constitutionally destroy existing contract rights).
See 122 S.W.2d at 1016.
" See Shively v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 349 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Ky.) (city ordinance
requiring railroad to finance and install safety devices at street crossings is valid exercise
of police power and, therefore, not a taking), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 120 (1961).
"3 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964) (regulation of billboards on highways is legitimate
exercise of police power).
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the attributes of a valid exercise of police power are a legitimate
public purpose'39 and a reasonable application.1?4 Kentucky courts
have consistently applied the majority rule of self-imposed ju-
dicial restraint. 141 They do not evaluate the wisdom of a regu-
lation but, instead, presume its validity. 42
However, this does not mean that all land use regulations
will pass constitutional muster. There will be cases where a
landowner can challenge and rebut the presumption of validity.
Specifically, in Kentucky, a regulation cannot interfere "with
the legally protected use to which land has been dedicated, which
destroys that use or places a substantial and additional burden
on the landowner to maintain that use. .... -143
Steams used this argument by claiming that the Act had
obliterated all reasonable uses of its land. 144 The Supreme Court
rejected the claim, listing the many activities which Stearns en-
gaged in throughout the period of the alleged taking. 145 However,
assuming that the Act had been implemented, had the Court
found that Stearns' sole existing activity at the time of the law's
enactment was the extraction and removal of coal in the area, 146
,39 Id. at 883. In Blancett v. Montgomery, 398 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1966), the city of
Calhoun issued an ordinance prohibiting oil and gas exploration within its boundaries.
When oil was discovered in the vicinity of the protected zone and removed, the restricted
landowners claimed their property had been taken without due process since the oil
beneath their soil, which they could not drill, was pumped away from the neighboring,
unrestricted land. The Court stated that the ordinance sought to avoid pollution and the
destruction of vegetation and was a valid exercise of police power.
1, 377 S.W.2d at 883. See Stephens v. Bonding Ass'n, 538 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Ky.
1976) (statute prohibiting bail bonding is not unconstitutional); Blancett v. Montgomery,
398 S.W.2d at 880.
-' Ratliff v. Fiscal Ct. of Caldwell County, 617 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Ky. 1981); Asbury
v. Robinson, 409 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Ky. 1966).
1 617 S.W.2d 36; 409 S.W.2d 508. See also notes 62-67 supra and accompanying
text.
1,3 Commonwealth v. Kelley, 236 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Ky. 1951) (action against state
for negligent maintenance of highways).
-, Appellee's Brief, supra note 111, at 11.
- The Court found that, during the period of the alleged taking, Stearns had
signed two private leases and a lease with the Commonwealth for hunting and wildlife
protection, and had conducted profitable logging operations as well. See 678 S.W.2d at
382.
" 6 Mr. Bob Gable, Chairman of the Board of Stearns Coal & Lumber stated in
his deposition, that his company "never engaged in any strip mining within the bound-
aries of either wild river in issue" and that it "had no plans to mine coal in the early
1970s as it was not economically feasible." See Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 28,
Commonwealth v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co., 678 S.W.2d 378 [hereinafter cited as
Appellant's Brief].
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it is possible that the Act's prohibition of deep and strip mining
would be a taking of Stearns' property.' 47 In addition, because
the Act did not permit the construction of new roads, 48 if
Stearns had, consequently, lost access to its coal, mining of the
land then would have been totally destroyed. 149 However, these
facts were not before the Court, and the Court's decision was
based first and foremost on the lack of implementation of the
Act.
In 1976, the Wild Rivers Act was amended and moderated. 50
In addition, the Act was formally implemented by the Cabinet. 5,
The question now arises: What holding can be expected when
another case, similar to Stearns Coal & Lumber, comes before
the Supreme Court of Kentucky? In 1979, Stearns sold to the
United States Government 12,227 acres of its property affected
by the Wild Rivers Act. 52 However, the company still owns
15,105 acres in the area.' 3 In addition, private property is found
along other streams also protected by the Act: Martins Fork,
Big and Little South Forks of the Cumberland, Red River and
Rockcastle River.5 4 Further controversy is clearly possible.
141 See KRS § 146.290 (1972) (amended 1976). But, it must be remembered that the
1972 Act also contained this strong language: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to deprive a landowner of his property or any interest or right therein without just
compensation." KRS § 146.280 (1972)(amended 1976). That such was the legislature's
intent was acknowledged many times by the Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet. See Appellee's Brief, supra note 111, at 10. Appellee also referred
to a formal opinion written by the Attorney General to the Courier-Journal stating that
"private property owners would be compensated." See id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
So, the statute would have required the Commonwealth to compensate Stearns Coal &
Lumber had it been deprived of its property.
14R See KRS § 146.290.
678 S.W.2d at 381.
'' See 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 197 (amending KRS §§ 146.210-.290 (1972)).
678 S.W.2d at 380.
' Appellee's Brief, supra note 111, at 37-38. The United States Government does
not have to comply with the Act. 678 S.W.2d at 382.
' Appellee's Brief, supra note 111, at 2.
1'' The following private land ownership pattern may be gleaned from the Kentucky
Wild River Management Plans (1980) obtained from the Department for Natural Re-
sources and Environmental Protection, and from conversations recently conducted with
the legal and technical personnel overseeing the Kentucky Wild Rivers:
Martins Fork (Cumberland River): The wild rivers corridor is 100% privately-
owned; there are 10-11 private tracts. Coal, sandstone, siltstone and shale are found in
the vicinity.
Big South Fork (Cumberland River): Private property ownership has greatly de-
creased since Stearns Coal & Lumber Co.'s sale of a large portion of its property to the
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The major change brought by the 1976 amendments is a
clarification of the language of the original Wild Rivers Act.
The amendments indicate that the Commonwealth does not in-
tend to use the power of eminent domain to a great extent and
will carry out its Wild Rivers mandate mostly through the ex-
ercise of police power. 5 5 Another important change is an in-
crease in land uses permitted in the stream areas: all uses existing
at the time a stream was included in the system are now al-
lowed; 56 roads and structures may be built to facilitate a per-
United States Government. No exact percentage is available. Coal is present in the
corridor.
Little South Fork (Cumberland River): There are about 50 private landowners in
the corridor, or 100% private ownership. Coal, oil, limestone, sandstone and shale are
found in the corridor.
Red River: More than 60% of the corridor is privately-owned; there are 14 tracts.
No mineral resources exist in the corridor itself, but coal, oil, natural gas, limestone
and clay are in close vicinity.
Rockcastle River: 50% of the land in the corridor is owned by 30 landlords. The
corridor holds coal, sandstone and limestone.
All above figures are approximate. Each Wild River Management Plan indicates
that land ownership information within the corridor "is not readily available due to the
absence of property ownership maps in the county tax or property valuation offices."
Kentucky Wild Rivers Management Plans. It is noteworthy that additional litigation has
occurred in the area. In Vaughn v. Commonwealth, No. 82-CI-189 (McCreary Cir. Ct.
December 31, 1983), 14 landlords initiated an action against the Commonwealth for the
denial of strip mining permits; however, the case was dismissed as barred by the statute
of limitations.
'" Before amendment, KRS § 146.220 (1972) provided:
It is not the intent of KRS 146.200 to 146.360 to require or to authorize
acquisition of all lands or interests in lands within the boundaries of the
stream areas but to assure preservation of the scenic, ecological and other
values and to provide proper management of the recreational, wildlife,
water and other resources.
The 1976 amendments reinforced this section by the addition of the following:
It is the intent of KRS 146.200 to 146.360 to impose reasonable regulations
as to the use of private and public land within the authorized boundaries
of wild rivers for the general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth,
and where necessary, to enable the department to acquire easements or
lesser interests in or fee title to lands within the authorized boundaries of
the wild rivers, so that the public trust in these unique natural rivers might
be kept.
KRS § 146.220 (1976).
Amended KRS § 146.280 clearly provides for monetary compensation for exercises
of eminent domain: "Nothing [in this Act] shall be construed to deprive a landowner
of the fee simple to or lesser interest in his property without just compensation." KRS
§ 146.280(t)(1976). These modifications evince legislative intent to implement the Act
through regulation of use, and not through acquisition of land.
,51 KRS § 146.290(1)(1976).
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mitted use; 57 strip mining remains prohibited, but deep mining
is allowed; 5 8 motor vehicles are tolerated for existing uses; 59
and lastly, a landowner may now apply for a change of use
permit in order to engage in an activity such as "the select-
cutting of timber, a resource removal or an agricultural use upon
2160his property located within the area....
In Stearns Coal & Lumber the Court adopted the test 6'
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City162 to ascertain the existence
of a taking of property:
The economic impact on the claimant and, particularly, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant consid-
erations .... So, too, is the character of the government ac-
tion. A "taking" may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government, . . than when interference arises
from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good. 63
The Kentucky Supreme Court identified the restrictions con-
tained in the 1972 Wild Rivers Act which, had it been imple-
mented, could have frustrated Stearns' "investment-backed
expectations": no new roads, no deep mining, no clear-cutting
of timber. 6' Because all these activities are now allowed, 65 the
Court could conclude that the Act is "reasonable and the pur-
pose of the law is within the overall scope of a public pur-
pose."'166
However, one might anticipate situations, under either the
Act or other land use regulations, where application of the law
1" KRS § 146.290(2)(1976).
"" Id.
I9 /d.
,, KRS § 146.290(3)(1976). The statute also provides for administrative and judicial
review. See KRS § 146.290(4)(1976).
See 678 S.W.2d at 381.
', 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (statute's designation of a building as an "historic site" is
not an unconstitutional taking).
Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
See 678 S.W.2d at 381.
See notes 156-59 supra and accompanying text.
678 S.W.2d at 382.
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to a particular piece of property will exceed permissible limits.1 67
In such a situation, a taking will be found. Thus, it is important
to consider the remedies available to any landowner challenging
excessive regulations. 1 6 This is a difficult question because, for
many years, there has been disagreement regarding proper relief
for regulatory takings. The debate concerns the suitability of
inverse condemnation and, if suitable, whether it should be
limited to damages for the period of the taking or extended to
actual acquisition by the government of land unreasonably made
a total loss.
III. REMEDIES: INVALIDATION OR MONETARY COMPENSATION
Since the Court found no taking, the remedy available for
environmental regulatory takings in Kentucky was not addressed
in either Commonwealth v. Stephens 69 or in Commonwealth v.
Stearns Coal & Lumber Co.170 Preferred relief for regulatory
takings traditionally is an injunction; the court invalidates the
regulation as applied to the particular property.'7' As one com-
mentator explains, "there has never been an absolute right to
"17 As stated by the United States Supreme Court: "[t]he Constitution measures a
taking of property not by what a State says, or by what it intends, but by what it does."
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
So, even though the Wild Rivers Act is constitutional, its enforcement might still
raise constitutional problems. See Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Regional Plan-
ning Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402, 408 (6th Cir.) ("[A] constitutional violation has occurred
as soon as an uncompensated taking is effected. The government's duty to pay compen-
sation then arises from the constitutional violation, not from any implied promise or
agreement."), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 80 (1984).
I" E.g., Davis v. Pima County, 590 P.2d 459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (excessive
restrictions on land use imposed through zoning ordinance effect unconstitutional "tak-
ing"), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979).
539 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1976).
678 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1984).
'7, See Davis v. Pima County, 590 P.2d 459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 942 (1979); Agins v. Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255
(1980) (injunction against enforcement of confiscatory zoning ordinance); Mountain
Medical Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs, 608 P.2d 821 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979) (ambul-
ance company refused compensation even after invalidation of offending statute); Fred
F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed,
429 U.S. 990 (1976) (excessive zoning regulation invalidated as unconstitutional); Eck v.
City of Bismark, 283 N.W.2d 193 (N.D. 1979) (in zoning dispute, monetary recovery
disallowed after declaratory relief was granted); Gary D. Reihart, Inc. v. Township of
Carroll, 409 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1979) (application of subdivision ordinance is not a "de
facto taking").
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compensation, even in cases in which an interference with prop-
erty rights sufficient to constitute a taking is clear.' ' 72 But such
relief is anomalous because the general rule is that equitable
relief is extraordinary and is granted only when there is no
adequate remedy at law or when the equities of the case justify
it. '71 However, public policy is the controlling factor in the area
of land use regulations, 74 and an injunction is granted or re-
jected on the basis of its social utility.' 75 Kentucky courts have
long agreed with this traditional view 76 and have awarded in-
junctive relief in regulatory taking situations. 77
However, language used by the Kentucky Supreme Court in
both Stephens and Stearns Coal & Lumber suggests that mone-
tary compensation may be possible for an illegal application of
the Wild Rivers Act and, by implication, for any unconstitu-
tional exercise of the police power. In Stephens, the Court stated:
"We hold the act to be enabling legislation and, as such, the
Commonwealth is required by Section 13 of the Kentucky Con-
stitution to pay for what it takes before the taking."'' 78 Stearns
Coal & Lumber was termed "an inverse or reverse condemnation
action,' ' '79 and nowhere did the opinion repudiate the propriety
of these proceedings in a regulatory taking situation. On the
contrary, the Court called the existence of a taking a "threshold
issue."'' 0 Despite holding that there was no taking as a matter
of law,'8 ' the Court discussed the issue of pre- and post-judgment
interest awarded by the trial court.'8 2 The award was reversed,
but the remedy itself was not challenged, 83 A few other states
have adopted the same position.'8 4
" Mandelker, supra note 14, at 495.
"' See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (anti-trust suit).
,' See notes 138-42 supra and accompanying text.
, For a discussion of this reversed remedial hierarchy, see Mandelker, supra note
14, at 491-92.
,,6 See, e.g., Hager v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
261 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1953) (zoning regulation contested).
" Id. at 620.
"' 539 S.W.2d at 307. See also Ky. CONST. § 242.
See 678 S.W.2d at 379.
' See id. at 380.
Id. at 382.
See id. at 383.
See id.
See, e.g., Duffield v. DeKalb County, 249 S.E.2d 235 (Ga. 1978) (inverse
condemnation action against county for negligent maintenance of water pollution plant);
Ventures in Property I v. City of Wichita, 594 P.2d 671 (Kan. 1979) (restriction on
property uses of private landowners); Mattoon v. City of Norman, 617 P.2d 1347 (Okla.
1980) (city flood plain ordinance dispute); Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington County,
581 P.2d 50 (Or. 1978) (recovery allowed for damages arising out of zoning ordinance).
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The question of what constitutes inverse condemnation re-
mains open. Kentucky does not view this remedy as an exact
replica of eminent domain proceedings.1 5 In Kentucky, one re-
ceives damages but does not sell the land to the regulating
authority. 8 6 Other states treat the remedial aspects of inverse
condemnation in various ways.8 7 There might even be cases
where a court invalidates the regulation and grants damages.""
This is an unsettled area of land use law.
The U.S. Supreme Court has neither endorsed nor rejected
inverse condemnation as a federal constitutional remedy, but
many commentators read Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego'89 as indicative of the
future.' 9° Justice Brennan acknowledged that a government's
exercise of police power, although constitutional, could be so
applied to effect a taking of property.'' Stressing the "essential
similarity" between regulatory takings and other taking cate-
gories, 92 he concluded that monetary compensation is obligatory
,"I Cf Commonwealth v. Widener, 388 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1965) (failure of State to
provide lateral support of lane during highway work is a ground for recovery in reverse
condemnation action).
'1 The McCreary Circuit Court stated: "The State does not receive a deed or
acquire title to the property .... Title remains in the property owner .... Our case
law clearly does not require the delivery of a deed in a reverse condemnation case."
Appellant's Brief, supra note 146, at 24a (quoting Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v.
Commonwealth, Civil Action No. 2994 (McCreary Cir. Ct. January 19, 1982)).
'1' It appears that Kansas favors condemnation proceedings, while Georgia and
Oklahoma favor damages. See the cases cited supra note 184.
11 See Duffield v. DeKalb County, 249 S.E.2d at 235. Although the parties were
suing for a nuisance (which generally commands monetary relief), the court found the
nuisance (odors and noise from the county's water pollution control plant) to be a
taking of property for public purposes. Therefore, theoretically, the Court would allow
both monetary and injunctive relief.
,-9 450 U.S. 621, 636-61 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The city of San Diego
downzoned the utility's property to limit industrial use and included it in an open-space
plan. San Diego Gas & Electric sued the city and sought damages in inverse condem-
nation. This relief was rejected by the California Supreme Court. For procedural reasons
the United States Supreme Court's plurality opinion did not reach the merits. However,
four Justices dissented, and Justice Rehnquist concurred on the procedure but implied
he would have joined the dissent had the plurality reviewed the merits of the case. See
id. at 633-34.
" See Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for "'Regulatory Tak-
ings", 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517, 532-39 (1980-81); Payne, The Supreme Court Tries
Again on Regulatory Takings, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 252 (1981-82); Note, Takings Law,
supra note 22, at 554.
'91 See 450 U.S. at 647-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112 See id. at 651.
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because a landowner is not made whole by invalidation of an
offending regulation. 93 However, Justice Brennan does not be-
lieve that local governments should be compelled to acquire title
to unreasonably regulated property. 194 The regulator might choose
to amend or rescind the challenged regulation; 195 the taking
would then be temporary, and just compensation would be
required only for the period of injury.9 6 Only if the regulator
chose not to modify the regulation would the taking become
permanent. 197 In this situation, since the Constitution does not
impose a particular remedy, Justice Brennan believes the states
should remain free to tailor relief according to their needs.198 He
concluded that "the landowner must be able meaningfully to
challenge a regulation that allegedly effects a 'taking', and re-
cover just compensation if it does so."' 199
' ' See id. at 655-57.
'9 See id. at 658. This idea also appears in the case law of many states. See, e.g.,
McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980) (airport zoning ordinance);
Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983) (land placed in "public use
zone" by zoning ordinance).
450 U.S. at 657.
' Id. at 657-58.
Id. at 658.
See id. at 660.
' ' Id. Justice Brennan also suggests another federal avenue for landowners-an
action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See id. at 656 n.23.
This statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Municipalities and local governments are "persons" as defined by the statute and
can be sued for constitutional and statutory violations. Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (mandatory unpaid maternity leave is an actionable
deprivation under § 1983). Plaintiffs may get declaratory or monetary relief under §
1983. For the various classes of damages that can be sought, see Rockwell, Constitutional
Violations in Zoning: The Emerging Section 1983 Damage Remedy, 33 FLA. L. REV.
168, 191-93 (1980-81). However, here too, injunctions are preferred over damages, and
a prayer for compensation is not satisfied automatically. See Hernandez v. City of
Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982) (city not
immune from damages in situation of excessive regulation); Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 474 F. Supp. 901 (D. Nev. 1979), aff'd, 661 F.2d 940 (1981) (only an
injunction may be obtained from an authority which does not have eminent domain
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Although Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas &
Electric suggests inverse condemnation as a possible federal rem-
edy,20° it is not obvious that this remedy will be adopted by the
Court. First, such a holding would apply only to federal courts
hearing federal questions. 20 1 State courts would be free to choose
a different path. 20 2 Consequently, injured landowners eager to
sue in inverse condemnation might be forced to go to federal
court for relief. However, a litigant doing so might risk having
his case dismissed as a result of the federal abstention doctrine.
Federal courts prefer to allow state courts to settle matters of
state and local policy without ever deciding the alleged federal
constitutional questions.203 A federal inverse condemnation rem-
edy would also be subject to this doctrine. 204
The United States Supreme Court has yet to consider appli-
cation of the abstention doctrine to land use takings, 205 but
several federal courts have done so. The First Circuit held in
Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Authorityt that "[flederal
enforcement of the inverse condemnation remedy would be a
singularly inappropriate intrusion into the states' traditional do-
main of property law and land use policy. '20 7 While this does
power). See also Cunningham, supra note 190, at 541-42; Johnson, Compensation for
Invalid Land Use Regulations, 15 GA. L. REv. 559, 583-97 (1980-81); Mandelker, supra
note 14, at 507; Manley, supra note 14, at 285.
Significantly, a § 1983 cause of action is not avaiiable against the states, which
frees most land use laws, such as the Wild Rivers Act, from such attack. Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-45 (1979). Therefore, a § 1983 complaint may not be useful
in a great number of instances.
- 450 U.S. at 657-60.
2' Some federal courts have already taken Justice Brennan's advice, and have
awarded compensation for inverse condemnation. See, e.g., Martino v. Santa Clara
Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983) (provisions in city flood plan constitute
an unconstitutional taking), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 151; Hernandez v. City of Lafayette,
643 F.2d at 1200.
20. See Burrows v. City of Keene, 432 A.2d at 15 (damages awarded in inverse
condemnation); Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d at 505 (compensation for
temporary and permanent takings can be obtained from local government); Zinn v.
State, 334 N.W.2d 67 (Wis. 1983) (compensation awarded for temporary taking).
203 For a discussion of the abstention doctrine in the eminent domain context, see
Muskegon Theatres, Inc. v. City of Muskegon, 507 F.2d 199, 201-05 (6th Cir. 1974).
See Cunningham, supra note 190, at 542-44; Mandelker, supra note 14, at 514.
. See Mandelker, supra note 14, at 514.
621 F.2d 33 (Ist Cir. 1980) (no "taking" of property without some statement
of government displacement of ownership).
207 Id. at 36. Accord Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596
F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1979) (if a controversy can be settled by ruling on a state issue,
constitutional adjudication should be avoided).
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not mean that federal courts will always refuse jurisdiction in
land use matters ,208 since the Supreme Court has shown such
reluctance in providing a federal solution to land use disputes
20 9
it is fair to say that the abstention doctrine will continue being
used by many federal courts, especially those sitting in states
demonstrating ingenuity in land use regulation.
210
Other serious problems cloud the future of regulatory inverse
condemnation. For example, allowing courts to order inverse
condemnation could be a judicial usurpation of legislative
power. 21 Also, the spectre of huge money judgments may have
a chilling effect on local government attempts at innovative
zoning. 212 The disbursements could create pandemonium in local
budgets and cause fiscal catastrophies. 23 On the other hand,
advocates of regulatory inverse condemnation point out that
invalidation neither remedies the landowner for past losses nor
penalizes the local government. 2 4 The government can effect a
slight change in the regulation and resume control of the land,
while the landowner remains burdened and uncompensated.
215
Both sides have strong cases and the debate continues. In
Kentucky, however, the trend is apparent. The state's judiciary,
with its long tradition of liberal interpretation of the boundaries
of police power,2 6 will not be likely to strike general welfare
legislation. Nevertheless, when it encounters excessive regula-
tions, the Court will not have its hands tied and will be able to
order compensation whenever justified. 21 7
CONCLUSION
This Note is predicated upon three principles: The first is
that the only unquestioned instance of taking is a physical ap-
"' See note 201 supra.
" See note 189 supra.
For a presentation of the values behind a "general policy of abstention" see
Note, Land Use Regulation, the Federal Courts, and the Abstention Doctrine, 89 YALE
L.J. 1134 (1980).
211 See Shedd, supra note 62, at 345-46; Note, supra note 28, at 1471-72. See also
Davis v. Pima County, 590 P.2d at 461; Agins v. Tiburon, 598 P.2d at 28; Eck v. City
of Bismark, 283 N.W.2d at 200.
21- See 598 P.2d at 30-31; 283 N.W.2d at 200.
MI See 598 P.2d at 30-31; 283 N.W.2d at 200.
214 See Note, supra note 28, at 1471.
2' Id.; Work, KO'd by Zoning: Who Pays?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 28, 1980, at 9, col.
2.
216 See notes 133-42 supra and accompanying text.
:, See notes 142-43 supra and accompanying text.
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propriation of property by government. Regulatory takings are
rare and are found only on a case-by-case basis. The second is
that economic due process violations, such as excessive land use
legislation, are tested by determining whether they are rationally
related to a valid objective of the state's police power. The third
is that aesthetic concerns are part of the general welfare and can
be legitimately included in comprehensive regulatory public pro-
grams.
All three principles were recently affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.,218 the Court stated: "Our holding today is very
narrow. We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical
occupation of property is a taking.... We do not, however,
question the equally substantial authority upholding a State's
broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon an owner's
use of his property. '219
In its latest term, the Supreme Court decided two other
relevant cases. The Court reviewed the Hawaii Land Reform
Act of 1967 in Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff,20 and con-
firmed the traditional deference to state legislatures acting within
their spheres of authority,22' as well as the necessity to avoid
"empirical debates over the wisdom of takings. '222 The rational
basis test was once more declared the only acceptable level of
scrutiny.223 In another case, Members of the City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,224 the Court reaffirmed that
"the state may legitimately exercise its police powers to advance
aesthetic values.' '225
These cases show that the Court, since Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon,226 remains reluctant to break new ground. The
ideological significance attributed by many to the substantial
dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego227
216 See notes 133-42 supra and accompanying text.
21 See notes 142-43 supra and accompanying text.
21- 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
219 Id. at 441 (emphasis in original).
104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
21 See id. at 2327.
2 Id. at 2330.
=2 See id.
21 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
21 Id. at 2129.
226 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
22 450 U.S. 621.
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might be affected by the replacement of Justice Stewart by
Justice O'Connor. What appears certain, however, is that the
Supreme Court will not readily limit the states' vast freedom to
legislate in the area of land use. The creative approach will
continue in a number of state legislatures and state courts while
more traditional attitudes will survive in others. Kentucky is a
member of the first group, and there are no signs that this
flexible stance towards land use legislation will take a different
turn in the future.
Monique Duparc Winther

